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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 135 
CORPORATIONS-EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION PLANS-NATURE OF CONSIDERA-
TION REQUIRED FOR VALID PLAN-Restricted stock option plans, approved 
by a majority of the stockholders, were adopted by the defendant corpora-
tion in 1951 and 1952 pursuant to, and in compliance with, section 218 
of the Revenue Act of 1950, for the purpose of" ... providing an incentive 
to participating key executive employees in the form of an opportunity to 
acquire a greater proprietary interest in the corporation and thus stimulate 
their efforts in the corporate welfare .... " The options were effective and 
exercisable anytime from the date of issuance to the end of a five-year 
period, with provision for termination three months after leaving the 
company's employ. The options were non-transferable and optionees 
stated that they exercised the options for investment only and not for 
distribution. In 1953 the directors passed a resolution pursuant to the 
amended Delaware Corporation Law that it was their opinion that the 
corporation had received and would receive good and sufficient considera-
tion for the options granted under the 1951 and 1952 option plans, and 
employment contracts were obtained from all option holders, dating from 
the time of the grant of options. In a stockholder's representative suit, 
held, the stock options were invalid for lack of consideration. At the time 
of granting the option, there must be conditions in the option plan, or in 
the circumstances, which reasonably assure the corporation that it will re-
ceive the benefit for which it bargained. Later resolutions or employment 
contracts cannot remedy the lack of consideration in the option grants. 
Frankel v. Donovan, (Del. Ch. 1956) 120 A. (2d) 311. 
In general, majority stockholders cannot make gifts of corporate assets 
for other than charitable purposes over the protest of a minority stock-
holder.1 There must be a consideration which meets the requirements 
of general contract law given in exchange for stock options.2 Normally 
this consideration cannot be based on the past services of an employee.8 
Some courts have, however, recognized exceptions to this rule when the 
options are granted for past services for which the option holder has not 
1 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 53 S.Ct. 731 (1933); Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, 
§122 (9). See generally 88 A.L.R. 744 (1934); 39 A.L.R. (2d) 1192 (1955); BALLANTINE, 
CoRPORATIONS 228 (1946); 6A FLETCHER, CYc. CORP., perm. ed., §2939 (1950); STEVENS, 
CORPORATIONS §§52 to 54 (1949). Of course, even charitable gifts are subject to the limita-
tion that they be reasonable. 
2 Kerbs v. California Eastern Ainvays, (Del. Ch. 1951) 83 A. (2d) 473, revd. (Del. 1952) 
90 A. (2d) 652, enforced (Del. 1952) 91 A. (2d) 62; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 
(Del. Ch. 1951) 83 A. (2d) 595, revd. (Del. 1952) 90 A. (2d) 660, reargued in part (Del. 
1952) 91 A. (2d) 57, enforced (Del. 1952) 92 A. (2d) 594. See also 39 VA. L. REv. 335 
(1953); 5 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP., perm. ed., §2142 (1952); WASHINGTON AND RomsCHILD, 
CoMPENSATING nu: CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 123 (1951). But see cases cited in note 6 infra. 
3 Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., (Del. 1948) 64 A. (2d) 581; Utica Fire 
Alarm Tel. Co. v. Waggoner Watchman Clock Co., 166 Mich. 618, 132 N.W. 502 (1911); 
Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 125, amended plan 
approved (D.C. Pa. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 488. See also 40 A.L.R. 1432 (1926); 5 FLETCHER, 
CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §§2137, 2140, 2143 (1952); 32 CALIF. L. REv. 88 (1944). 
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already been compensated4 or are granted for services rendered under a 
formal or informal agreement that additional compensation might be paid 
subsequently,5 or if the options have not risen in value above the option 
price at any time between the grant of the option and the commencement 
of the action.6 Generally the consideration for option rights is based on 
future services, and the most common benefits to the company found to be 
sufficient are employment contract rights, and the assumption or continua-
tion of corporate duties by the benefited employees.7 The Delaware courts 
have taken the strict view of requiring that there be conditions in the plan, 
or in the circumstances, which reasonably assure that the corporation 
will receive the benefits for which it bargained, i.e., that the consideration 
is not illusory. In the principal case the court rigidly adheres to this re-
quirement. While admitting that "It may seem captious to decline to find 
consideration in the undisputed fact that the option holders have not only 
remained with the corporation but have to some extent changed position 
by exercising options,"8 the court holds that the time for ascertaining 
whether the option plans are supported by sufficient consideration is not 
when the options are exercised but when they are granted.9 Therefore, 
in order for the consideration to be sufficient the Delaware decisions require 
(a) a benefit to the corporation (b) bargained and exchanged for the 
option (c) with reasonable assurance in the option plan, or in the circum-
stances, that the corporation will receive the benefit for which it bargained .. 
These requirements can easily be met, and future representative suits 
4 Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., note 3 supra; Hurt v. Cotton States 
Fertilizer Co., (5th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 52, cert. den. 331 U.S. 828 (1947). See also 5 
FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP., perm. ed., §§2113 to 2118 (1952). . 
5 National Loan &: Investment Co. v. Rockland Co., (8th Cir. 1899) 94 F. 335; Rich• 
ardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., (D.C. Ky. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 658, alfd. (6th Cir. 1942) 
127 F. (2d) 291, cert. den. 317 U.S. 639 (1942). . 
6 Abrams v. Allen, 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 170 (1942), 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 174 (1942), alfd. per 
curiam 266 App. Div. 835, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 641 (1943); Leech v. Fuller, 173 Misc. 543, 19 
N.Y.S. (2d) 98 (1939), alfd. 259 App. Div. 816, 20 N.Y.S. (2d) 398 (1940). The New York 
courts hold these options are not assets since they are worthless. This view overlooks the 
speculative _value of the option which allows the option holder to take advantage of any 
increase in the value of the stock without investment or risk of loss. See 49 CoL. L. REv. 
232 at 234 (1949). 
· 7Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., note 3 supra; Kerbs v. California Eastern 
Airways, note 2 supra; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., note 2 supra; McQuillen v. 
National Cash Register Co., (D.C. Md. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 639, alfd. (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. 
(2d) 877, cert. den. 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Sandler v. Schenley Industries, 32 Del. Ch. 46, 79 
A. (2d) 606 (1951); Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 103 (1942), affd. 265 App. Div. 919, 
39 N.Y.S. (2d) 412 (1942), alfd. per curiam, 292 N.Y. 554, 54 N.E. (2d) 683 (1944); Clamitz 
v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 158 F. (2d) 687, cert. den. 331 U.S. 825 (1947). 
s Principal case at 315. 
9 Elster v. American Airlines, (Del. Ch. 1953) 100 A. (2d) 219. See also 1 CoNTRAcrs 
lu:sTATEMENT §75, comment c (1932). Del. Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1954) tit. 8, §157 
provides in part: "In the absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the 
directors as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options and the suffi-
ciency thereof shall be conclusive." The court considered the issue in the principal case 
not to be the ". • . corporate judgment as to consideration or its sufficiency but the very 
existence of consideration as of the time the options were granted," and thus not within 
the statute. Principal case at 316. 
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avoided, by tying stock options to employment contracts for a specific 
period. Greater insurance that the corporation will receive the benefit for 
which it bargains is obtained when the options are exercisable only after 
a specified period of employment,10 preferably in installments, with the 
consideration to the corporation for each installment reasonably commen-
surate with the benefits granted.11 
Richard E. Day 
10 See Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., (N.J. Ch. 1952) 92 A. (2d) 862. 
11 On adequacy see generally 32 CALIF. L. REv. 88 (1944); Carson, "Current Phases of 
Derivative Actions Against Directors," 40 MICH. L. REv. 1125, 1150 (1942); WASHINGTON, 
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES COMPENSATION 293 (1942); 5 FLETCHER, Cvc. CORP., perm. ed., §2143 
(1952). 
